Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does Closing the Door Matter Anymore? by Troiano, Kenneth
California Western Law Review 
Volume 24 Number 1 Article 6 
1987 
Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does Closing the Door 
Matter Anymore? 
Kenneth Troiano 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr 
Recommended Citation 
Troiano, Kenneth (1987) "Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does Closing the Door Matter 
Anymore?," California Western Law Review: Vol. 24 : No. 1 , Article 6. 
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/6 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by CWSL Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in California Western Law Review by an authorized editor of CWSL Scholarly Commons. For more 
information, please contact alm@cwsl.edu. 
COMMENTS
Law Enforcement Use of High Technology: Does
Closing the Door Matter Anymore?*
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Katz leaves his apartment and heads down the street to the
glass-enclosed telephone booth on the corner. He steps inside,
closes the door behind him, deposits a coin and places his call.
Mr. Jones arrives to use the phone and patiently waits his turn.
Trying to determine how long he will have to wait, Mr. Jones tries
to listen to the conversation, but cannot hear a thing.
Mr. Katz and Mr. Jones, however, are not the only people inter-
ested in this conversation. The police, suspicious of Katz's involve-
ment in illegal gambling, are maintaining vigilant surveillance
over him. Figuring Katz would eventually use the pay phone, they
came prepared. They brought with them their newly acquired la-
ser listening device. This device transmits a laser beam directly at
the glass booth and interprets the signal reflected back to the de-
vice. The result is an augmentation' of the policeman's hearing
(i.e., aural capabilities) to such a degree that the officer is essen-
tially standing in the telephone booth with Katz.
The policeman's suspicions are correct. Katz has just discussed
the details of his illegal gambling operation. As he exits the booth
he is immediately arrested based solely upon the conversation in-
tercepted by the officer.
Is Katz's telephone conversation protected by the fourth amend-
* California Western Law Review Scriba Regis Award 1987-1988.
1. "Augment" means "[t]o make greater, as in size, extent or quantity; enlarge;
increase" AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 87 (1981). See, e.g., United States v. Knotts,
460 U.S. 276, 283 (1983), where now Chief Justice Rehnquist used the term in the follow-
ing passage: "Nothing in the fourth amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the
sensory faculties bestowed upon them at birth with such enhancement as science and tech-
nology afforded them in this case." (At issue in Knotts was the use of beepers planted in a
suspect's property to emit electronic signals in order to facilitate tracking by the police.)
For purposes of this Comment, "sensory augmentation" will be limited to those devices
that increase the capabilities of the human senses such as hearing, seeing, and smelling.
The use of aircraft generally shall not be considered within this category, because, al-
though an advancement in technology, they enhance the vantage point, not augment the
senses. See, e.g., United States v. Broadhurst, 805 F.2d 849 (9th Cir. 1986) and Blalock v.
State, 483 N.E.2d 439 (Ind. 1985) (no reasonable expectation of privacy from aerial sur-
veillance when conducted from public navigable airspace on a greenhouse).
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ment? Does the policeman's eavesdropping constitute a search or
seizure? Under what circumstances, if any, would such eavesdrop-
ping be justified? Is the degree of sophistication associated with
this technology relevant? This Comment explores these and other
issues related to the ever increasing use of high technology by law
enforcement officials to combat crime.
Law enforcement has long utilized available technology to aug-
ment their senses in order to effectively detect criminal activity.
Starting with searchlights2 flashlights3 and binoculars; 4 and pro-
gressing to telescopes,5 bugs,6 and beepers; 7 those responsible for
protecting and maintaining the public's safety have used these de-
vices for a twofold purpose. First, they have been used to enhance
the ability to perceive what was previously imperceptible. Second,
they have made possible observations from vantage points that al-
low the police to avoid detection by those being observed.
Technological advances have significantly furthered these pur-
poses. As a result, we now live in an age where technology can be
used to observe individuals regardless of most precautions they
take to preserve their privacy. Satellites located far away in the
earth's orbit can observe the earthly movements of individuals
with precision.' Infrared technology can furnish images of activi-
ties occurring well beyond the protection that darkness provides.9
Telescopes,'0 high precision cameras" and other optical aids en-
able those occupying secluded vantage points to augment their vis-
ibility to a degree which places them within a range of vision pre-
viously unobtainable. Aural senses are heightened by advances in
laser and acoustical technologies. 2 Moreover, canine training
techniques provide enhancement of olfactory capabilities that in
effect equate to the development of a high technology nose.' 3
2. United States v. Lee, 274 U.S. 559 (1927).
3. Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983); United States v. Coplen, 541 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1976); State v. Loyd, 92 Idaho 20, 435 P.2d 797 (1967).
4. State v. Ward, 617 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1980); People v. Ciochon, 23 Ill. App. 3d
363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974).
5. United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D.Haw. 1976).
6. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
7. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
8. S. HOCHMAN. SATELLITE SPIES (1970).
9. Forward looking infrared radar (F.L.I.R.). United States v. Porter, 701 F.2d
1158 (6th Cir. 1983); Unites States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978); reh'g denied.
See Los Angeles Times, June 11, 1987, at 3, Los Angeles Times, July 26, 1987, (maga-
zine), at 27.
10. United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2nd Cir. 1980).
II. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
12. New 'Bugs' Make Spying Easier, Bus. Wk., July 12, 1982, at 76.
13. United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696 (1983). This Comment will not address
canine sniffing because it only reveals the absence or presence of contraband and is there-
fore distinguishable from the more general sensory augmenting devices addressed. Id. For
[Vol. 24
2
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/6
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Balanced against the needs of law enforcement, however, is the
individual's right to privacy as protected by the fourth amendment
of the Constitution of the United States guarantee against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures.' 4 Under the fourth amendment, in-
trusions into an individual's privacy are protected by the require-
ment of a warrant based on probable cause.15  However, this
requirement can be avoided if no search or seizure occurs,"
Accordingly, courts have recently avoided finding an exception
to the warrant requirement by holding that the obtaining of infor-
mation by law enforcement through the use of sensory aug-
menting devices constitutes neither a search nor a seizure." This
approach has been taken more frequently and appears to be the
trend in fourth amendment jurisprudence. 18
This Comment explores the limitations of that view currently
taken by courts in the face of modern technological advances.
First, this Comment reviews the prevailing fourth amendment
analysis in this area including most recent United States Supreme
Court decisions, California v. Ciraolo'9 and Dow Chemical Co. v.
United States.20 Second, it critiques the Court's approach to ad-
dressing the threat technological advances pose to individual pri-
vacy by centering on the inherent limitations and resulting impli-
an example of fourth amendment considerations regarding the intrusiveness of canine snif-
fing see United States v. Thomas, 757 F.2d 1359 (2d Cir. 1985); United States v. West,
731 F.2d 90 (lst Cir. 1984). Horton v. Goose Creek Ind. School Dist., 690 F.2d 470 (5th
Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207 (1983). For examples of cases dealing with police
observations using human sense of smell, see United States v. Sohns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985);
United States v. Haley, 669 F.2d 201 (4th Cir. 1982); United States v. Dien, 609 F.2d
1038 (2d Cir. 1979); United States v. Martin, 509 F.2d 1211 (9th Cir. 1975).
14. The full text of the fourth amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONsT. amend. IV.
15. Id. The Supreme Court has suggested that to have probable cause for a search
the available information must show "a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a
crime will be found in a particular place." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See also
infra note 111.
16. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S.Ct. 1819 (1986). Moreover,
other inroads into the fourth amendment requirements for a warrant based on probable
cause already exist. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) ("good faith" reliance on
search warrants lacking probable cause); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search
incident to arrest); United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless arrest of a
felon in a public place); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) ("stop and frisk" on the basis of
"reasonable suspicion").
17. Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
18. See Comment, Police Use of Sense-Enhancing Devices and the Limits of the
Fourth Amendment, 1977 U. ILL. L.F. 1167 (1977).
19. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
20. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
19881
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cations of the analysis set forth in Dow and Ciraolo. Third, this
Comment recommends a limiting principle and discusses its impli-
cations in striking a balance between protecting individual privacy
rights and enabling law enforcement officials to effectively detect
and control crime. Finally, it makes an application of this limiting
principle to hypothetical scenarios, similar to the one with Mr.
Katz, as a means of testing this principle's feasibility in likely
situations.
I. THE PREVAILING ANALYSIS
A. Explicit Coverage
The fourth amendment explicitly protects "the right of the peo-
ple to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures." Traditionally, this
explicit fourth amendment coverage has included the home and
the area immediately surrounding the home, known as the curti-
lage.22 However, areas beyond the curtilage are considered "open
fields" and are beyond the explicit coverage of the fourth amend-
ment.23 This is not to say that an individual is completely without
privacy when participating in activities beyond the curtilage.
However, one must have a "reasonable expectation of privacy" to
be protected by the fourth amendment.24
21. U.S. CONsT. amend IV.
22. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 180 (1984).
Recently in United States v. Dunn, 107 S. Ct. 1134, 1139 (1987), the Supreme Court
clarified the definition of curtilage as follows:
We identified [in Oliver] the central component of this inquiry as whether the
area harbors the "intimate activity associated with the 'sanctity of a man's home
and the privacies of life.'" (citation omitted). Drawing upon the Court's own cases
and the cumulative experience of the lower courts that have grappled with the
task of defining the extent of a home's curtilage, we believe that curtilage ques-
tions should be resolved with particular reference to four factors: the proximity of
the area claimed to be curtilage to the home, whether the area is included within
an enclosure surrounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is
put, and the steps taken by the resident to protect the area from observation by
people passing by.
Additionally, the Court went on to reject the government's suggestion to adopt a "first
fence rule" which would limit the extension of curtilage to the "nearest fence surrounding
a fenced house." Dunn, 107 S. Ct. at 1139 n.4. Thus, fourth amendment protection is still
available to "a structure lying outside a home's enclosing fence" provided it satisfies the
above guidelines." Id.
23. Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
24. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
4
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B. Reasonable Expectation of Privacy
In the landmark decision Katz v. United States,25 the Supreme
Court held that an individual's telephone conversation in a public
telephone booth enjoyed protection from police surveillance with
an electronic listening device placed on the outside of the booth.
Justice Stewart, in rejecting the notion that a search required a
physical invasion, stated that such governmental activity Violated
the privacy upon which the individual justifiably relied while using
the telephone booth and thus constituted a search and seizure
within the meaning of the fourth amendment.26 The majority
found the fact that the conversation took place in a glass booth in
a public location not dispositive of whether the individual had a
right to privacy.27 The Court reasoned that it was the uninvited
ear not the intruding eye that the individual sought to exclude
when he shut the door behind him.28
Restating the majority opinion, Justice Harlan in his concur-
rence reasoned that Katz had a constitutionally protected "reason-
able expectation of privacy" in his telephone conversation. 9 This
reasonable expectation of privacy embodied a two-prong test:
"first that a person have exhibited an actual (subjective) expecta-
tion of privacy, and second, that the expectation be one that soci-
ety is prepared to recognize as 'reasonable.' "30 Justice Harlan's
two-prong test has since become the prevailing rule for determin-
ing whether an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy
and is thus entitled to protection from unreasonable searches and
seizures under the fourth amendment.3 Accordingly, a "search"
occurs "when an expectation of privacy that society is prepared to
consider reasonable is infringed."32
The Supreme Court has recently applied the Katz standard in
the companion cases of California v. Ciraolo33 and Dow Chemical
Co. v. United States.3 4 The Court held that the actions of the gov-
ernment authority in both cases did not constitute a search.35
25. Id. at 358.
26. Id. at 353.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 352.
29. Id. at 360 (Harlan, J., concurring).
30. Id. at 361.
31. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978).
32. United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984) (quoting United States v.
Jacobsen, 446 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)).
33. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
34. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
35. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States,
106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). In Ciraolo the police did not employ sensory augmenting technol-
1988]
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In California v. Ciraolo,36 the Court held that the naked-eye
observation from an altitude of 1,000 feet of a backyard within
the curtilage of a home did not constitute a search. Chief Justice
Burger, writing for the majority, reasoned that although the de-
fendant clearly manifested a reasonable expectation of privacy
from the ground level by erecting a 10-foot fence around the cur-
tilage of his backyard, the same was not true for observations
made by police while lawfully occupying a vantage point in public
navigable airspace.3 7 The Ciraolo Majority stated that what a
person "knowingly exposes" to the public, even in his own home,
is not subject to fourth amendment protection.38 Significant to the
Court was Ciraolo's failure to employ adequate means to protect
his backyard from the particular type of observation made by the
police.39 Unlike Katz, Ciraolo failed to shut the door behind
him.40 Somewhat ironically then, while the Katz standard might
afford an individual a reasonable expectation of privacy beyond
the curtilage of his home when adequate protective measures are
employed, failure to do the same while within the confines of one's
own backyard will leave them unprotected by the fourth
amendment.41
In Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,42 the Court once again
applied the Katz standard to an aerial observation. In Dow, how-
ever, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used a high
precision aerial mapping camera mounted on-board an aircraft to
facilitate their surveilling activities. 43 The Court concluded that
despite Dow's extensive efforts to protect the open areas of their
industrial complex from ground-level intrusions, they did not have
a reasonable expectation of privacy from the aerial observations
ogy and in Dow the EPA arguably did.
36. 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1813 (1986).
37. Id. at 1812. Public navigable airspace is generally considered to be above 1,000
feet over congested areas and above 500 feet over rural areas. See 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 (29),
1304 (1986), and 14 C.F.R. § 91.79 (b-d) (1986). Also, for a recent case interpreting
Ciraolo, as implying that the 1,000 feet minimum flight altitude over congested areas is the
lower limit on unaided aerial observance not considered a search, see People v. Sabo, 185
Cal. App. 3d 845, 230 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2200 (1987). But see
State v. Layne, 623 S.W.2d 629, 632-636 (Tenn. Cr. App. 1981).
38. California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1812 (1986) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)).
39. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1812.
40. Actually Ciraolo failed to obstruct the aerial vantage point from visual surveil-
lance. The Court apparently adopts the State's contention that Ciraolo left a "knothole"
through which the police could look. Id. at 1811. For an example of the potentially prohibi-
tive costs of taking such precautions, see Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct.
1819, 1827 n.l (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting).
41. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. at 1813.
42. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
43. Id. at 1822.
[Vol. 24
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made by the EPA.44
The Court discussed at length the ramifications of the EPA's
use of the aerial mapping camera.45 The camera was distinguished
from other types of technology on the basis of its common availa-
bility in the marketplace.46 Moreover, the degree to which the
camera enhanced visual observation in this case decidedly did not
give rise to constitutional implications.47 The Court, relying on
United States v. Karo,48 found that merely taking the photographs
without enlarging them only constituted a "potential" invasion of
privacy. However, since the photos were not exploited via enlarge-
ment no fourth amendment considerations were raised in this con-
text. 49
However, the Court continued its discussion of technology, in
what can only be considered dictum,50 by intimating that surveil-
lance of private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance
equipment, not generally available to the public, such as "satellite
technology," might constitute a search.51 Thus, the Court again
used the availability of the technology as a critical factor in deter-
mining the need for fourth amendment protection.52
Despite the fact that the Court found that no "search" occurred
44. Id. at 1827. In so concluding the Court rejected Dow's contention that the area
observed was "industrial curtilage" and thereby entitled to full fourth amendment protec-
tion, holding that, although neither, it was closer to "open fields" than to curtilage. Id. at
1825-26.
45. Id. at 1826-27.
46. Eg, off-the-shelf, commonly available technology. Id. at 1826.
47. Id. at 1826-27.
48. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
49. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 n.5. In United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712
(1984), the Court held that the attaching of a beeper to a can of chloroform that one of the
defendants had purchased did not constitute a search or a seizure. Since there was no
"meaningful interference with the defendants' possessory interests, there was not a seizure.
Id. at 712 (quoting United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984)). Similarly, as
"an expectation of privacy that society was prepared to consider reasonable" was not "in-
fringed," there was not a search. Karo, 468 U.S. at 712.
The Court acknowledged that the attaching of a beeper did create the "potential" for an
invasion of privacy but "[i]t is the exploitation of technological advances that implicates
the Fourth Amendment, not their mere existence." Id. Thus, it was not until the beeper
was tracked within Karo's home that a search had occurred. Id. at 712.
Similarly, in Dow, the existence of a photographic negative merely created the potential
for an invasion of privacy. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1827 n.5. However, since the negative was
not significantly enlarged, the EPA had not yet exploited the technological advances pro-
vided by the high precision aerial mapping camera, and therefore there was not a search.
Id.
50. Although this Comment considers the capabilities of the aerial mapping camera
used in Dow to be equivalent to those of a satellite, the EPA in Dow did not use a satellite,
and therefore, any discussion of its legal implications is done by the Court without any
factual basis.
51. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826.
52. Presumably, the Court views the use of satellite technology as currently beyond
the reach of most people.
1988]
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in either case, there are two major distinctions between Ciraolo
and Dow. First, the area observed in Ciraolo was within the curti-
lage and therefore explicitly covered by the fourth amendment.5 3
On the contrary, the area observed in Dow was not considered
curtilage but Dow nonetheless had a reasonable expectation of
privacy from ground level intrusions.54 Thus Dow, like Katz, was a
case where the reasonable expectation of privacy concept was used
to extend fourth amendment protection, albeit limited to ground-
level intrusions, to an area not previously acknowledged as deserv-
ing such protection.5"
Second, Dow, unlike Ciraolo, utilized technology to augment
the senses."6 Specifically, in Dow, the E.P.A.'s vision was en-
hanced by an aerial mapping camera.57 This distinction, however,
was blurred by the majority analysis in Dow. On one hand, the
Court discussed the distinctions between commonly available and
not commonly available technology.58 On the other hand, the
EPA's failure to enlarge the photographs taken of Dow's complex
to any "significant degree" was found to be critical. 59 Thus, the
Court left unclear whether its holding, that there was not a
search, rested on the type of technology used or the degree to
which it augmented the observer's senses.60
In summary, it would appear that the protective measures taken
by Dow relative to the degree of sensory augmentation employed
by the EPA was the pivotal analytical round upon which the
53. See supra note 22 and accompanying text.
54. See supra note 44.
55. The limitation of Dow's reasonable expectation of privacy to protect their facil-
ity only from ground level intrusions naturally leads one to suspect that had a lip reader
visually observed the conversation of Katz, the Court would have held that neither a search
nor a seizure had occurred.
56. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
57. Id.
58. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1826. The Court considers the aerial mapping camera used
here to be generally available to the public despite its cost of $22,000.00 (see id. at 1833
n.12 (Powell, J., dissenting)).
59. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
60. This is significant because the Court has left open two questions to be answered
at a later date by the Court itself or lower courts. First, does the classification of the type
of technology used by police as "commonly available" place the police activities beyond
fourth amendment protection and judicial scrutiny regardless of the extent of the intrusion
occurring in a particular case? Second, will trial courts be required to make factual deter-
minations of the extent of sensory augmentation enjoyed by the police in a particular case
before deciding whether to admit or exclude the evidence on fourth amendment grounds?
Additionally, if the former is answered in the affirmative, what then will be the standard
for classifying the type of technology? Similarly, if the answer to the latter question is yes,
what standard will the courts apply? The limiting principle suggested by this Comment
addresses the second inquiry (see infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text) and rejects the
first as illogical (see infra notes 68-71 and accompanying text).
[Vol. 24
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Court determined that a search had not occurred."1
From the Court's premise, one is led to speculate that had the
EPA employed less available or more sophisticated technology in
Dow, or had the police in Ciraolo used an aerial mapping camera
to observe activity occurring within the curtilage, that there would
have been different results in both cases. 2
II. A CRITICISM OF THE PREVAILING ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court, and most lower courts since Katz, have
limited an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy to what
is not "knowingly exposed" to the public. 3 However, absent some
limit on what constitutes a knowing exposure, such a test is un-
manageable when confronted with the regular use by police of
technology. 64 For instance, when a person opens their curtains to
allow in light they presumably trade off a portion of their right to
privacy. However, to whom do they knowingly expose the activi-
ties taking place within their home? To the nosey neighbor per-
haps, or even the annoying door-to-door solicitor. However, does
the mere act of opening your curtains signal to those perched far
away with a sophisticated vision augmentating device that the ac-
tivities going on in your living room are theirs for the viewing?
Limiting an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy by
what they knowingly expose to the public carries alarming impli-
cations for an ever-eroding fourth amendment. As pointed out by
61. "The mere fact that human vision is enhanced somewhat, at least to the degree
here, does not give rise to constitutional problems" (footnote omitted). Dow, 106 S. Ct. at
1827.
62. Additionally, a "significant" enlargement of the area observed would be re-
quired. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v.
United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986); State v. Barnes, 390 So. 2d 1243 (Fla. App. 1980);
State v. Ward, 617 P.2d 568 (Haw. 1980); State v. Littleton, 407 So. 2d 1208 (La. 1981);
Commonwealth v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904 (1970).
64. See Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv.
349, 406-407 (1974) [hereinafter Amsterdam], where Professor Amsterdam stated:
Now, it seems to me that the analysis of these cases in terms of voluntary assump-
tion of risk is wildly beside the point. The fact that our ordinary social intercourse,
uncontrolled by the government, imposes certain risks upon us hardly means that
government is constitutionally unconstrained in adding to those risks. Every person
who parks his or her car on a side street in Greenwich Village voluntarily runs the
risk that it will be burglarized-a risk, I should add as one who has lived in
Greenwich Village, that is very much higher than the risk of betrayal by your
friends even if you happen to choose your friends exclusively from a circle of
Machiavellian monsters. Does that mean that government agents can break into
your parked car uncontrolled by the fourth amendment?
See also United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252, 1256 (D.Haw. 1976), where Chief
Judge Samuel King stated: "The fact that Peeping Toms abound does not license the gov-
ernment to follow suit."
1988]
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Professor Amsterdam:"5
Such a narrow approach raises the question of how tightly the
fourth amendment permits people to be driven back into the re-
cesses of their lives by the risk of surveillance . . . -so far as I
am presently advised on the state of the mechanical
arts-anyone can protect himself against surveillance by retiring
to the cellar, cloaking all the windows with thick caulking, turn-
ing off the lights and remaining absolutely quiet. This much
withdrawal is not required in order to claim the benefit of the
amendment because, if it were, the amendment's benefit would
be too stingy to preserve the kind of open society to which we
are committed and in which the amendment is supposed to
function.6"
The alternative to the withdrawal described by Amsterdam is
for individuals to protect their reasonable expectation of privacy
by staying technologically one step ahead of those employing so-
phisticated means of observation. However, such an alternative is
neither feasible nor justifiable. After all, who other than the pro-
fessional criminal, or perhaps the wealthy individual, will find it
economically feasible to pursue such an alternative? Moreover, it
is not merely the rights of the criminal or the wealthy, but those
of the ordinary law-abiding citizen that the fourth amendment
and its exclusionary rule are intended to protect.67
Furthermore, the Supreme Court's distinction between equip-
ment which is and which is not generally available to the public
does not make sense. First, from the perspective of intrusiveness
there is no difference. Whether it is a telescope being used from a
nearby building, or a satellite in a distant orbit, the information
65. Professor Amsterdam is a Professor of Law at Stanford Law School. His arti-
cle, Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REv. 349 (1974), is
the text of the Oliver Wendell Holmes lectures, delivered by Professor Amsterdam at the
University of Minnesota Law School on January 22, 23, and 24, 1974. The article is con-
sidered to be one of the most insightful scholarly works on the fourth amendment as
evinced by the reliance placed on it by other scholars and courts. See, e.g., 1 LAFAVE,
SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 342-43 (2d ed. 1987);
United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 136 (2d Cir. 1980).
66. Amsterdam, supra note 64, at 402.
67. Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggravating
incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it contains their sub-
stance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose. It may be that it is the
obnoxious thing in its mildest and least repulsive form; but illegitimate and uncon-
stitutional practices get their first footing in that way, namely: by silent ap-
proaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be
obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional provisions for the security of
person and property should be liberally construed. A close and literal construction
deprives them of half their efficacy and leads to gradual depreciation of the right,
as if it consisted more in sound that in substance. It is the duty of courts to be
watchful for the constitutional rights of the citizen, and against any stealthy en-
croachments thereon.
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 635 (1886).
[Vol. 24
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observed by the observer is equally revealing.68
Second, the imposition placed on the observed is not lessened
when the observer uses equipment that is available to ordinary cit-
izens. The imposition takes the form of the cost to protect oneself
from such observations, and the time and effort that taking such
precautionary measures detracts from one's life.69 Regardless of
whether the observer is using a satellite or an aerial mapping cam-
era mounted on a airplane, the individual is still burdened with
taking extreme precautionary measures in order to protect those
intimate activities associated with the home and traditionally af-
forded fourth amendment protection from uninvited intrusions.
Thus, although defenses are available to individuals to protect
their privacy, they should not be forced to resort to those defenses
in order to maintain a constitutional right once previously af-
forded. As Justice Powell argued in his dissenting opinion in Dow,
"Privacy rights would be seriously at risk as technological ad-
vances become generally disseminated and available in our soci-
ety" if such a distinction was accepted by the Court.71
Finally, the distinction in technology is unnecessarily arbitrary
from a law enforcement perspective. To hold that a given police
observation was a searh merely because the type of technology
used was not "commonly available" would deprive the police of
the use of an effective technological advancement when other less
effective but equally intrusive means could be readily employed. 1
68. See, e.g., United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131, 138 n.7 (2nd Cir. 1980),
where Circuit Court Judge Kearse discussing this contention stated: "We reject the govern-
ment's notion that because elementary telescopes have been used since 1608 their use is
significantly less intrusive than the use of more modern auditory devices." Therefore, al-
though it is probably true that a correlation may exist between the relative unavailability of
technological devices and their augmentation capabilities, the critical question is the degree
of intrusion.
69. For example, in Dow, 106, S. Ct. at 1828 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting), Justice
Powell noted the prohibitive nature of the expense Dow would have had to incur in order to
protect itself against aerial surveillance with a high precision aerial mapping camera.
The record establishes that Dow used the open-air design primarily for reasons of
safety. Dow determined that, if an accident were to occur and hazardous chemi-
cals inadvertently released, the concentration of toxic and explosive fumes within
enclosed plants would constitute an intolerable risk to employee health and safety.
Moreover, as the Court correctly observes, Dow found that the cost of enclosing
the facility would be prohibitive. Ante, at 1822, 1825. The record reflects that the
cost of roofing just one of the open-air plants would have been approximately
$15,000,000 in 1978. The record further shows that enclosing the plants would
greatly increase the cost of routine maintenance. App. 74-75."
Also, such companies as CCS Communication Control, Inc., 633 Third Ave., New York,
NY 10017, provide sophisticated countermeasures for those who can afford to take high
technology precautionary measures.
70. Dow, 106 S. Ct. at 1833 (Powell, J., dissenting).
71. The term "readily employed" is intended to indicate that a search warrant
would not be required. See supra note 51.
1988]
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The police should be allowed to use all reliable means of detection
available to them, subject only to legitimate constitutional
limitations.
III. A LIMITING PRINCIPLE UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
FOR THE USE OF TECHNOLOGY
A. The Solution: The Definition of a Search by the Use of
Sensory Augmenting Technology
The solution to the increasing challenge technology poses to in-
dividual privacy rights lies in placing a workable limitation on its
use by police. A careful definition of when the use of technology
by police constitutes a search will provide that solution. The fol-
lowing definition of such a search is suggested: A search is the use
of technology to augment the senses in order to obtain information
that could not have otherwise been obtained from a lawful van-
tage point without such an augmentation. In other words, it is not
a "search" to use technology to augment the senses in order to
obtain information that would be otherwise obtainable from a law-
ful vantage point without the aid of sensory augmentating devices.
Under this definition, an individual would have a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy from those intrusions that could not be made
lawfully without the use of sensory augmenting technology. This
proposition has already been acknowledged implicitly by lower
courts7 2 and suggested by Professor LaFave73 in the context of po-
72. Accord United States v. Taborda, 635 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1980); United States
v. Lace, 502 F. Supp. 1021 (D. Vt. 1980); United States v. Kim, 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D.
Haw. 1976); State v. Barnes, 390 So.2d 1243 (Fla. App. 1980;); State v. Ward, 617 P.2d
568 (Haw. 1980); State v. Kender, 588 P.2d 447 (Haw. 1979); People v. Ciochon, 23 I11.
App. 3d 363, 319 N.E.2d 332 (1974); State v. Louis, 196 Or. 57, 672 P.2d 708 (1983). But
see Fullbright v. United States, 392 F.2d 432 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 830;
Cooper v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 118 Cal. App. 3d 499, 173 Cal. Rptr.
520 (1981); People v. Hicks, 49 Il1. App. 3d 421, 7 Ill. Dec. 279, 364 N.E. 2d 440 (Il1.
App. Ct. 1977); Johnson v. State, 2 Md. App. 300, 234 A.2d 464 (1967); Commonwealth
v. Hernley, 216 Pa. Super. 177, 263 A.2d 904, (Pa. Super. Ct. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 914,
73. LAFAVE. SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
339-42 (2d ed. 1987):
Under this particular balancing of privacy and law enforcement interests, it is
submitted, fourth amendment restrictions should not be imposed when the police
have done no more than: (1) use binoculars to observe more clearly or carefully
that which was in the open and thus subject to some scrutiny by the naked eye
from the same location; or (2) use binoculars to view at a distance that which they
could have lawfully observed from closer proximity but for their desire not to re-
veal the ongoing surveillance. When this is the nature of the police conduct vis-a-
vis evidence or conduct located in the open, the assistance provided by the binocu-
lars should not be characterized as a search.
Professor LaFave went on to address the more difficult problem of law enforcement use
of binoculars or similar equipment to look inside of premises stating that the two primary
12
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lice use of binoculars. Moreover, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized this limiting principle in its decision of United States v.
Knotts.7
4
In Knotts, the Court held that it was not a search for the police
to monitor signals transmitted from a beeper placed in a drum of
chloroform that the defendant transported on public streets." The
Court reasoned that individuals do not maintain a reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy in their public movements.7 6
In discussing the use of a beeper to track individuals the Court
acknowledged that the use of such a device enabled the police to
ascertain the ultimate resting place of the drum when they would
have been unable to do so had they relied solely on their naked
eyes. 7 Ultimately, however, the Court held that a search did not
take place.7 18 The Court found several facts critical: "[T]here
[was] no indication that the beeper was used in any way to reveal
information as to the movement of the drum within the cabin, or
in any way that would not have been visible to the naked eye from
outside the cabin." 79 Thus, the Court left open the question of
whether the police could use a sensory augmenting device to ob-
tain information not otherwise obtainable from a lawful vantage
point without such augmentation.80
This question was soon answered in the negative by the Su-
preme Court in United States v. Karo.81 In Karo, the Court held
considerations would be: "(I) the level of sophistication of the equipment utilized by the
police; and (2) the extent to which the incriminating objects or actions were out of line of
normal sight from contiguous areas where passersby or others might be." (footnotes omit-
ted) LaFave also criticized the Hernley case cited supra note 72 as a "less than adequate
analysis of these factors" in light of Katz.
74. 460 U.S. 276 (1983). The majority opinion was written by now Chief Justice
Rehnquist.
The reliance on Knotts by the majority in California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809,
1918 (1986), was considered misplaced by the dissent. Id. at 1818 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). The dissent limits the holding in Knotts to police observations of pub-
lic activity not the type of activity taking place within the curtilage. Id. However,
the majority considers Knotts to stand for the proposition that unaided police ob-
servations from a lawful vantage point do not constitute a search. Id. at 1812.
Inasmuch as the latter accurately depicts the majority view, this Comment is in
accord.
75. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 236.
76. Id. at 281-282.
77. Id. at 286. The DEA agents could have kept track of the suspect with only the
use of naked eye surveillance. However, they chose to end their visual surveillance, presum-
ably to avoid being detected, when the suspect began making evasive maneuvers. Id. at
278.
78. Id. at 286. Since the DEA did not obtain any information that could not have
been obtained unaided from a lawful vantage point (but for the need to avoid being de-
tected), the holding in Knotts embodies the limiting principle suggested in this Comment.
79. Id.
80. See United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984).
81. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
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that monitoring a beeper placed in a drum while it was located
inside the home of one of the defendants constituted a search. 82
The Court reasoned that such monitoring revealed a critical fact
about the interior of the defendants' premises that the government
was extremely interested in knowing but that it could not have
otherwise obtained without a warrant.8 3
Similarly, lower courts have held that police surveillance, al-
though performed from a lawful vantage point, is a search, be-
cause it reveals critical information that they could not have oth-
erwise obtained without the use of sensory augmentation. 4 In
United States v. Kim,85 the federal district court suppressed evi-
dence obtained by FBI agents who observed the defendant in his
apartment a quarter mile away through the use of an 800 millime-
ter telescope with a 60 millimeter opening.8 The court stated that
such an observation did not constitute a "plain view" since it was
not obtained unaided but through the use of "powerful technol-
ogy."87 Kim is particularly significant because the court employed
the reasonable expectation of privacy test suggested by Justice
Harlan in Katz.8 Accordingly, the defendant did not fail to mani-
fest a subjective expectation of privacy merely by leaving the cur-
tains in his apartment open,8 9 for it was not a naked eye observa-
tion that was afforded the FBI, but an augmented one.90
Moreover, the telescope was used not as a means of avoiding de-
tection, but as a means of perceiving what was imperceptible to
the general public from a lawful vantage point. 91 Thus, Kim aptly
82. Id. It should be noted that although there were three separate opinions written,
the Court was unanimous in affirming the defendants' convictions. Justice O'Connor, with
whom Justice Rehnquist joined, expressed concern over the extent of the privacy interests
of a homeowner relative to the interests of the owner of this container in which the beeper
was planted. Id. at 721 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Also, Justice Stevens, joined by Justices
Brennan and Marshall, concurred in the above holding, but dissented from the Court's
holding that the attachment of the beeper did not constitute a seizure. Id. at 728 (Stevens,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
83. Id. at 715. See also supra note 49.
84. See supra note 72.
85. 415 F. Supp. 1252 (D. Haw. 1976).
86. The degree of augmentation that the telescope afforded the FBI should be con-
sidered substantial since it enabled the FBI to read the title of the paper the defendant was
reading inside his hotel room while they were located approximately a quarter of a mile
away. Id. at 1254.
87. Id. at 1256. The Court went on to indicate that "[t]his case does not present a
situation where private parties have a plain (unaided) view of the defendant's premises but
government agents are forced to use visual aids because they were not able to get as close
to the defendant's premises as the private parties." Id. at 1256 n.4.
88. Id. at 1256-57.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1254.
91. See supra note 87. More recently the California Supreme Court has adopted
the same view in light of the decisions in Ciraolo, and Dow. People v. Mayoff, 42 Cal.3d
[Vol. 24
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illustrates the limiting principle suggested here.
B. Implications of the Limiting Principle
1. The Individual's Perspective-The proposed limiting prin-
ciple would provide individuals with a bright line rule with which
they could determine the extent of their privacy rights and gauge
their conduct accordingly. Application of the rule would not re-
quire knowledge of the capabilities of technology or specifically
what law enforcement currently has in its arsenal. When a person
conducts activities in their backyard or within their home without
drawing the curtains, they "knowingly expose" themselves only to
the observation of those who can see, hear, or smell what they are
doing without sensory augmentation from a lawfully occupied po-
sition. Thus if their activities are visible from the street with the
naked eye, they are on notice that they may be observed from a
distant location with a telescope.92 However, if they are not visible
from the street with the naked eye, then they have no need to take
protective measures in order to keep their intimate activities pri-
vate from those operating with sophisticated technology from dis-
tant or hidden locations.3
2. The Law Enforcement Perspective-The essential use of
technology is to avoid detection by those being observed. 4 This
purpose will be preserved for law enforcement if the limiting prin-
ciple is adopted. Police need not be limited to "commonly availa-
ble" technology. Whatever device that could be of use, may be
1302, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2 (1986). In Mayoff, the court stated that "[o]ptical enhancers may
not be used to shorten that visual distance." Id. at 1316 n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. at 10. How-
ever, the court noted that "[o]n the other hand, the safest, most practical, and least intru-
sive method of surveillance may sometimes be to fly well above the minimum permissable
altitude for naked-eye observation then to utilize magnifying devices to compensate for the
increased distance." Id. Thus, the Mayoff court has adopted the limiting principle ex-
pressed in this Comment. Ultimately in Mayoff, the use of an 80-200 millimeter telephoto
camera lens from an airplane flying at altitudes between 1000 and 2000 feet to observe
marijuana growing on the defendant's property was not a violation of the fourth amend-
ment because the photographs revealed nothing more than what could be observed with the
naked eye from that altitude and the area observed was primarily outside the curtilage. Id.
92. What could be seen from the street includes the degree of detail corresponding
to such an observation. For instance, being able to see a coffee table through an individual's
living room window would mean being able to discern with some certainty the identity of
the objects lying on the table. However, this would not necessarily mean that the observer
could read a newspaper lying on the table. Thus, if only the presence of papers could be
discerned from a lawful vantage point, the police could not use a telescope to read the
words on the papers. See, e.g., People v. Wright, 242 N.E.2d 180 (Ill. 1968).
93. This does not include the use of airplanes unless equipped with sensory aug-
menting technology. See supra note 1; and "Plane" view hypothetical infra IV-C.
94. See supra notes 73, 77, 78 and 87.
1988]
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used.9 Thus, police may take advantage of state-of-the-art tech-
nology without having to wait for the rest of society, including
criminals, to catch up.98 However, there will be some constraints.
If an officer uses technology to put his eyes, ears, or nose where
they could not otherwise constitutionally intrude, it will be consid-
ered a search and the officer will need to justify his actions in
accordance with fourth amendment requirements.97
Moreover, the mere existence of a lawful vantage point from
which unaided observations could be made will not give police
carte blanche to make the best possible observation that technol-
ogy will allow. Police will still bear the burden of proving, if chal-
lenged, that the technology used did not provide them with any
information that could not have been obtained unaided from a
lawful vantage point98 (i.e., that they did not "excessively" aug-
ment their senses). If they cannot make such a showing, their ac-
tions will constitute a search and therefore require some justifica-
tion before the evidence will be admitted in a trial.99
In summary, the implications of this limiting principle provide
bright line rules with which both individuals and police can judge
the protection and constitutionality of their conduct respectively.
Individuals will not enjoy unfettered privacy nor will police be un-
controlled in their use of technology. For individuals, the desire to
be protected must be purchased at some cost to privacy.1 0 For
95. Of course, this does not preclude legislative attempts to enact statutory controls
on the use of technology in an effort to either protect privacy rights to a greater degree
than afforded under this limiting principle and existing case law or control the potentially
exorbitant costs associated with buying time on a satellite or renting aircraft equipped with
sophisticated sensory augmenting technology.
96. This is not to say that they could not use state-of-the-art technology under cur-
rent Supreme Court rulings. However, as suggested by the Court in Dow, the use of such
technology might require a search warrant. See supra note 46. Furthermore, the limiting
principle suggested in this Comment is not intended to preclude challenges to the use of
technology by police on other grounds such as inadmissibility of scientific evidence because
the principle upon which it is based has not been sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance among the scientific community. See, e.g.. United States v. Kilgus, 571
F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978); see generally Frye v. United States, 293 F.2d 1013 (D.C. Cir.
1923); People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 549 P.2d 1340 (1976).
97. Le., a warrant based on probable cause obtained from a neutral detached officer
of the court. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV. But see supra note 16, and more recent Supreme
Court decisions such as New York v. Class, 106 S. Ct. 960 (1986) (although a search to
open car door and look at Vehicle Identification Number (VIN), it was "sufficiently unin-
trusive" and therefore did not require any justification), and New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325 (1985) (search of student's private belongings by public school official may be
justified on only "reasonable suspicion").
98. See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 104 S. Ct. 3296 (1984).
99. See supra note 98.
100. Recognition of the need to balance. See, e.g., LA FAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE:
A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT, 339 (2d ed. 1987). See also New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 327 (1985).
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police, some challenges will be posed.10 1 However, "[1]aw enforce-
ment in a free society is always faced with difficult challenges. As
one court has so eloquently noted, 'A policeman's job is easy only
in a police state.' "1102
IV. HYPOTHETICAL SCENARIOS
The feasibility of this limiting principle is tested by applying it
to hypothetical fact patterns which have or could likely occur, and
then examining the results. The fact patterns used cover the use of
technology to augment the different senses of vision and hearing,
and illustrate the distinctions between which police actions would
or would not constitute a search under the principle suggested in
this Comment.
A. The Open Curtains I
1. Facts - Under this scenario, Mr. Homeowner leaves the
curtains on his front window open. The window is located approxi-
mately thirty feet from the street. Thus, a passerby could easily
take a view of the inside of the home by standing in the street.
Officer Right has received an anonymous tip that Mr. Homeowner
is growing marijuana in his home. Officer Right now must corrob-
orate this tip.' 03 He drives by the home of Mr. Homeowner in an
unmarked car. The curtains are wide open. Right wants to be ac-
curate, and in order to avoid tipping-off Homeowner by a pro-
longed view from the street, he decides to take a step back and
observe from the open field across the street. Right obtains a tele-
scope and proceeds to observe from across the street in the field.
The tip is corroborated, the affidavit sworn, and the warrant is-
sued. Homeowner is arrested and moves to suppress the evidence
claiming his fourth amendment rights against unreasonable search
and seizure have been violated.
2. Result-Homeowner's motion should be denied. Officer
Right, like the tipster, could have seen the marijuana lawfully
from the street.0 4 However, in order to avoid detection, he took a
step back and used a telescope to augment his vision. Homeowner
101. For example, avoiding "excessive" augmentation.
102. People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 82, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743, 748, 315 N.E.2d 792,
795 (1974).
103. See generally Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). See also Draper v. United
States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959).
104. Assuming Right has faculties and training equivalent to the officer who was
able to recognize 8-10 feet high marijuana plants from 1,000 feet away in an airplane in
California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1810 (1986).
19881
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knew or certainly should have known his living room was exposed
to those on the street.
B. The Open Curtains II
1. Facts-Bif, a Southern California botany aficionado, rents
an apartment with a large window with a southern exposure. He
purchases many bright green exotic plants and brings them home
to adorn his apartment. His building manager, nosey and impa-
tient with youth, notices all of Bif's plants while surreptitiously
entering the apartment. The manager figures he is just another
pot-head growing his own marijuana and proceeds to anonymously
inform the police in order to rid himself of Bif.
Officer Wrong is put on the case. Wrong tries to corroborate
this tip with some independent evidence.10 5 Unfortunately for
Wrong, Bif's apartment is on the second floor and more than 200
feet from the nearest building. Wrong is allowed to temporarily
use an apartment on the second floor of the building across the
street. Much to Wrong's chagrin, he cannot see into Bif's apart-
ment with his naked eye although the curtains are open. Wrong
borrows Right's telescope and takes a view. Although trained in
narcotics detection, Wrong is deceived by the striking familiarity
with which Bif's plants resemble marijuana. Wrong obtains a
search warrant and proceeds to search Bif's apartment.
2.. Result-Officer Wrong's actions are wrong. The plants are
not marijuana. Bif, a night-shift worker, is awaken, dresses, and
submits to Wrong's search of his apartment. Bif's right to privacy
has been intruded upon by this unlawful search.
3. Compare: Right and Wrong-Bif should not have been in-
truded upon. Bif, like Homeowner, left his curtains open. Unlike
Homeowner, however, the interior of Bif's apartment could not be
viewed lawfully from a vantage point that would yield a naked eye
observation of its interior. Thus, Wrong did not utilize the tele-
scope to avoid detection like Right, but to gain information about
the inside of a home that would not have been otherwise obtaina-
ble without the use of such a device. Therefore, Wrong is required
to use a search warrant in order to obtain such information. 0 6
Under the Court's view of technology in Dow, Wrong could be
right. This is because telescopes are commonly available technol-
105. See supra note 103.
106. Bif may bring a Civil Rights action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1986). However,
this Comment is concerned with protecting privacy rights from intrusions, not the remedies
available to those individuals whose privacy rights have already been intruded upon.
[Vol. 24
18
California Western Law Review, Vol. 24 [2015], No. 1, Art. 6
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol24/iss1/6
POLICE USE OF HIGH TECHNOLOGY
ogy and Bif's curtains were left open. Arguably, the result could
differ if the view was made from an observatory miles away.10 7
However, this distinction is illogical since the intrusiveness of the
act does not lessen with the advancement in technology. The same
level of detail is revealed in both situations.
As for Homeowner, he is caught in the balance between privacy
rights and law enforcement needs. He had an opportunity to make
an informed decision. He gambled on leaving his curtains open
and lost. However, the decision to leave his apartment open to a
view by others did not require him to judge what view the latest
technology could provide law enforcement. His decision was based
on what a naked eye observation could provide. This is the subtle
but critical distinction underlying the limiting principle suggested
here.
C. A "Plane" View
1. Facts-Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) Agent
Hawk has been conducting an on-going investigation into the nar-
cotics trafficking within the more affluent communities of Los An-
geles County. Through his investigation Hawk has learned that
large quantities of marijuana, earmarked for Beverly Hills, have
left Mexico regularly on Wednesday mornings by van.
Unable to pinpoint the precise destination of the marijuana,
Hawk obtained an airplane to fly over the Beverly Hills area on
Wednesday afternoon to see what he could uncover. In order to
avoid detection by both the traffickers and the territorial Beverly
Hills Police Department, Hawk decided to maintain a flight alti-
tude much in excess of the minimum 1,000 feet required by
law."0 8 However, Hawk equipped the plane with a high precision
aerial mapping camera enabling him to make detailed observa-
tions from this far away vantage point.10 9
Much to Hawk's delight, his aerial observations and subsequent
review of the enlarged photographs uncovered not one, but two
potential felonies. First, Hawk was able to determine, on the basis
107. Since observatories provide visual augmentation not "commonly available" to
ordinary citizens, it could be inferred that according to the dicta in Dow their use would
constitute a search and therefore require a search warrant. See supra note 51.
108. See supra note 37.
109. See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986), where the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) used a twin engine Beechcraft equipped with a
sophisticated Wild RC- 10 aerial mapping camera. The trial court described the capabilities
of the camera as follows: "[Slome of the photographs taken from directly above the planet
at 1,200 feet are capable of enlargement to a scale of 1 inch equals 20 feet or greater,
without significant loss of detail or resolution." Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F.
Supp. 1355, 1357 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
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of his experience and training, that several bales of what appeared
to be marijuana had been unloaded from a van into the backyard
of socialite Candy. Second, Candy's neighbor, Soviet emigre
Svetlana, was seen in her backyard reviewing documents marked
"Top Secret-U.S. Government." Hawk quickly relayed this in-
formation to the FBI. On the basis of the information obtained
through Hawk's surveillance, search warrants were executed at
both homes, the contraband was seized and Candy and Svetlana
were arrested. Attorneys for both defendants made pretrial mo-
tions to suppress the evidence of the basis of violations of their
clients' fourth amendment rights.
2. Results-Candy's motion should be denied. Svetlana's mo-
tion should be granted. At both hearings, the government would
be required to show that probable cause existed on the basis of
photographs that represented a naked eye view from a flight alti-
tude of at least 1,000 feet."10 In Candy's case, such an observation
could have led a well trained narcotics officer to believe it more
likely than not marijuana bales were being unloaded in her back-
yard."' However, in Svetlana's case, all that could be seen from
such an observation would be a woman reading papers." 2 Since
this could not be the basis of probable cause, or even reasonable
suspicion, that a crime was being committed, the evidence should
110. In accordance with the limiting principle suggested by this Comment.
I ll. Applying the stricter standard for the degree of probability required to attain
probable cause. See, e.g., Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959). But see, Illinois v.
Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) ("fair probability"). See also supra note 15. For a discussion
of the degree of probability required to establish probable cause see Grano, Probable
Cause and Common Sense: A Reply to the Critics of Illinois v. Gates, 17 U. MICH. J.L.
REF. 465 (1984). See generally, LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT 586-606 (2d ed. 1987).
112. However, the government might argue that the information obtained from the
accidental surveillance of Svetlana's backyard was done so "inadvertently" and is therefore
not a search as falling within the "plain view" exception to the search warrant require-
ment. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971). The plain view doctrine enables
the police to seize an item based on an inadvertent discovery made during a lawful initial
intrusion (i.e., search or seizure) where they have probable cause to believe that the item
seized is contraband or evidence of a crime. Arizona v. Hicks, 107 S. Ct. 1149 (1987);
Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983).
In this hypothetical, the police may have occupied their position in public navigable air-
space lawfully. However, with regard to their view of Svetlana's backyard, the augmenta-
tion obtained through the use of the camera, in effect, placed them in Svetlana's backyard.
Without a warrant, such an intrusion would be unlawful. Therefore, the plain view excep-
tion would not apply even though the inadvertence requirement was met.
Additionally, in light of California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986), the inadvertence
requirement of the plain view doctrine may no longer be valid. This is because the majority
rejected the dissent's contention that a "focused" observation was different than a "routine
patrol" finding that no relevant or legal distinctions could be made. Id. at 1813 n.2. Thus,
although Ciraolo is not technically a "plain view seizure" case, such language casts doubt
on the future of the inadvertence requirement.
[Vol. 24
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be suppressed. 3
D. The Voices From Beyond
1. Facts-Mr. Goodfellow, while barbecuing in his backyard,
overheard his neighbor Bill Press discussing with his guests what
seemed to be the logistical details of a conspiracy to print and
distribute counterfeit U.S. currency. Realizing his civic duty,
Goodfellow immediately notified the U.S. Treasury Department.
Agent Harken was put on the case. Since Goodfellow's back-
yard was not conducive to being a vantage point for surveillance,
Harken obtained permission to conduct surveillance of Press from
the residence across the street. Harken and his team of Secret
Service agents used a camera with a telephoto lens to photograph
the vehicles and people visiting Press, while a parabolic
microphone"" was used to listen to and record Press' poolside
conversations.
On the basis of the conversations overheard, Harken determined
that Press had acquired contraband paper, ink, and printing
plates. A search warrant was issued, the Press home searched, and
Press and his co-conspirators arrested for conspiracy to counterfeit
U.S. currency." 5 The defense attorney moved to suppress the evi-
113. Compare Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986). In Dow,
the majority understood the facts found by the trial court to indicate that the photographs
taken were not enlarged and thus there was no actual invasion of Dow's privacy rights. See
supra note 49. However, the trial court did find that:
[O]n the contrary, when flying at 1,200 or 5,000 feet, the eye can discern only the
basic sizes, shapes, outlines, and colors of the objects below. In this case, the finest
precision aerial camera available was used to take the EPA photographs. The
camera successfully captured vivid images of Dow's plant which EPA could later
analyze under enlarged and magnified conditions. In doing so, the camera saw a
great deal more than the human eye could ever see. The Court therefore would
agree with Dow that the use of a sophisticated aerial camera is, at a minimum, on
a par with other methods of visually enhanced surveillance in terms of its
intrusiveness.
Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 536 F.Supp. 1355, 1367 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
This finding can be interpreted as meaning that the advantage of the camera was that it
provided the EPA with a snapshot that could only have been obtained had the plane stood
still long enough to allow a person to make an accurate naked eye observation. Thus, ar-
guably it was not an enlargement (magnification) by the camera that was at issue, but the
helicopter-like hovering advantage that the camera provided. See, e.g., People v. Mayoff,
42 Cal. 3d 1302, 1316 n.6, 233 Cal. Rptr. 2, 10 (1986).
Unfortunately in Dow, neither the trial court nor the Supreme Court disclosed the extent
of any magnification that the camera might have provided. Therefore, the limiting princi-
ple suggested in this Comment may have been violated, and as a result, a search would be
found (if a magnification results), or not even called into play (absent a magnification).
114. A parabolic microphone is capable of picking up sounds several feet away by
pointing the microphone in the direction of the person to be heard.
115. The probable cause necessary to support the search warrant is assumed to be
based only on the conversations overheard by Agent Harken. Thus, the tip from Mr. Good-
fellow is not used to support the search warrant except inasmuch as it is relied upon to
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dence obtained as a result of the search warrant claiming the war-
rant was based on information obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment.
2. Result-The motion should be- denied. The government
need only prove that the poolside conversations overheard with the
parabolic microphone could have been overheard without it if
Harken had chosen to risk detection by listening from Goodfel-
low's backyard or the street.116 The testimony of Goodfellow as to
the conversations he overheard prior to the commencement of sur-
veillance would help the government establish this fact. 1"
CONCLUSION
The limiting principle suggested by this Comment is intended to
strike a balance between the interests of individuals in preserving
corroborate Harken's ability to overhear the conversations from Goodfellow's backyard.
See infra note 117 and accompanying text. Moreover, the photos are not used to establish
probable cause. However, even if the photographs taken were used to support an affidavit
or introduced into evidence at trial, they would be admissible because there is no fourth
amendment protection from police observing the people and cars visiting an individual's
home. United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983). Moreover, in this hypothetical the
photographs only revealed information that could have been obtained unaided from the
street or the consenting neighbor's backyard but for the need to avoid detection. Therefore,
the use of photographs would be consistent with the limiting principle suggested here.
, 116. For cases dealing with police eavesdropping on conversations see United States
v. Jackson, 588 F.2d 1046 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Muckenthaler, 584 F.2d 240
(8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Fisch, 474 F.2d 1071 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding no search
for police to listen unaided to defendant's conversation through keyhole in door); State v.
Moses, 367 So. 2d 800 (La. 1979); State v. Day, 50 Ohio App. 2d 315, 362 N.E.2d 1253
(1976).
Moreover, the prohibition on the use of evidence of intercepted "oral communication"
existing under 18 U.S.C. § 2515 (1982) should not apply to these circumstances. The
prohibitions under that section apply only to those oral communications unlawfully inter-
cepted under 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (1982). The conversation listened to by Harken would not
be unlawful because they would not qualify as an "oral communication" as defined by 18
U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982).
18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1982) states: "'oral communication' means any oral communica-
tion uttered by a person exhibiting an expectation that such communication is not subject
to interception under circumstances justifying such expectation;" Courts have consistently
held that the legislative history behind § 2510(2) reflects Congress's intent that Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), serve as a guide to define communications that are
uttered under circumstances justifying an expectation of privacy. United States v. Harrel-
son, 754 F.2d 1153, 1169-1171 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Padilla, 520 F.2d 5265,
527-528 (lst Cir. 1975); United States v. McIntyre, 582 F.2d 1221, 1223 (9th Cir. 1978).
Thus, since the application of the limiting principle suggested in this Comment would not
afford Bill Press with a reasonable expectation of privacy in his po6lside conversations (i.e.,
no search), 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2521 would not apply. This is not, however, a situation
where one of the parties to the conversation consented. Therefore, 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(c)
is not applicable. Also, for an example of more stringent state statutory requirements mak-
ing it unlawful to intercept certain oral communications see CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 630-
637.5.
117. See supra note 98 and the accompanying text.
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their privacy rights from erosion in the face of technological ad-
vances and the needs of law enforcement to take advantage of
those advances in their efforts to effectively detect and control
crime. The contrast between these two interests is heightened by
the tension between technological advances and criminal sophisti-
cation. As technology advances, the abilities of the police to
gather information from sources never before accessible are
greatly increased. Moreover, as criminal organizations become
more sophisticated and continue to infiltrate legitimate business
operations, their impact on society, and consequently the need to
control them, is also increased.
Since the landmark decision of Katz v. United States,118 the Su-
preme Court has struggled to maintain this balance. However, the
Court has yet to clearly define what effect technological advances
will have on an individual's expectation of privacy. The recent de-
cisions in Dow Chemical Co. v. United States,1 9 and California v.
Ciraolo'20 illustrate this point. In Dow the Court struggled with
distinguishing types of technology on the basis of their availabil-
ity12' and the significance of the marginal results the technology
produced. 2 However, no clear guidance was provided for individ-
uals to gauge the extent of their privacy rights or for courts to
judge the constitutionality of police actions. In Ciraolo, the Court
indicated a possible adoption of a "knothole"' 23 approach for de-
fining what is a "reasonable expectation of privacy." Unfortu-
nately, this decision did nothing to indicate any limitation upon
the extent to which an individual will be required to bear the bur-
den of "plugging" the "knothole" poked in his privacy by an ad-
vance in technology.
It is inevitable that the Supreme Court will be presented with a
case that squarely presents the technology issue. When that day
comes, the Court should adopt the limiting principle suggested
here as a means of maintaining the delicate balance between law
enforcement needs and individual privacy rights while remaining
consistent with its holdings in United States v. Knotts,124 and
118. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
119. 106 S. Ct. 1819 (1986).
120. 106 S. Ct. 1809 (1986).
121. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
122. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
124. 460 U.S. 276 (1983).
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United States v. Karo125 and most importantly, with the spirit of
the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.126
Kenneth Troiano*
125. 468 U.S. 705 (1984).
126. Let us return to the hypothetical posed in the introduction and answer the ques-
tions presented in light of the limiting principle suggested in this Comment and the hy-
potheticals illustrating its application.
Mr. Katz will succeed in suppressing the content of his conversation. Since Mr. Jones
could not hear the conversation without opening the door, the police could not use sensory
augmenting technology to listen beyond the closed door. Like the Mr. Katz in Katz. v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the expectation of privacy implicated by closing the
door to the phone booth is a reasonable one.
Therefore, when the police infringed on this reasonable expectation of privacy, their ac-
tions constituted a search. Since this search cannot be justified by probable cause and a
warrant or an exception, the conversation overheard is inadmissible at trial.
Most importantly, an individual's right to privacy is maintained in the face of ever-
advancing technology. Accordingly, the need to gauge our expectations of privacy by the
latest advancements in technology is eliminated.
* The author would like to thank:
Professor Laurence A. Benner, California Western School of Law for his guidance, in-
sight, and friendship.
Barbara and Frederick Troiano and Susan Schillo for their love and support.
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